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Pollack: Assistance of Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
People v. Nunez'
(decided March 19, 2004)
John Nunez was charged with "attempted murder in the
second degree, assault in the first and second degree, criminal
possession of a weapon in the second and third degree and reckless
endangerment in the first and second degree." 2 The indictment
alleged that while trying to kill Edwin Cachola, the defendant
caused serious physical injury to a two-year-old girl.'

A Wade

hearing 4 was then conducted before the court pursuant to Section
710.60(4)' of New York Criminal Procedure Law as the defendant
moved to suppress the evidence from a pre-arraignment line-up
conducted at the precinct." Two issues were before the court. The
first was "whether the identification procedures employed by law
enforcement in this case were unduly suggestive," 7 which the court
concluded were not.'

The second issue was the basis of the

defendant's constitutional claim, which was "whether [he] was
denied his right to counsel at his pre-arraignment line-up." 9 The
court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence in

2'No.

id.
3id.

35-2003, 2004 WL 556591 at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 19,2004).

4 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1610 (8th ed. 2004) defines a Wade hearing as:
"A pretrial hearing in which the defendant contests the validity of his or her outof-court identification."
5 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.60(4) (McKinney 1995) states when the court

must conduct a hearing and make findings of fact essential to the determination of
granting or denying a motion.
6Nunez,2004

WL 556591, at *1.

7id.

'Id at*I n.2.
Id.

9
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the line-up identifications stating that " 'without some notice or
other legally recognized excusal of counsel's presence, the police
took the risk that the adduced evidence would not be allowed.' "0
On December 29, 2002, defendant surrendered to the 75
Precinct accompanied by his attorney, Mr. Murphy."

Mr. Murphy

helped facilitate the defendant's surrender and upon their arrival at
the precinct, he told the police that he represented the defendant.,2

Thereafter, Mr. Murphy waited four hours while the police
prepared a series of lineups before notifying the police that he had
another appointment and had to leave.'3

He "left the precinct

shortly before 1:00 PM and within twenty minutes of his leaving,
all eight line-ups had been conducted."' 4

While there was

conflicting testimony as to whether Mr. Murphy had left his
business card with the police, the record showed that the police in
no way attempted to contact Mr. Murphy after he left the precinct
and before the lineups were conducted. 5
The

defendant's

motion

to

suppress

the

lineup

identification evidence was based on his right to counsel granted in
both the United States Constitution 6 and the New York State
10 Id. at *6 (quoting People v. Wilson, 680 N.E.2d 598, 601 (N.Y. 1997)).
" Nunez, 2004 WL 556591, at *4.
12 id.
13id.
14

1d. at *3.

15 id.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ...."
16
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Constitution. 7 The court recognized that the defendant did have a
right to counsel but had to determine when that right attaches.
The United States Supreme

Court defined

when a

defendant's right to counsel attaches in Kirby v. Illinois.8

In

Kirby, the victim reported that he had been robbed of his wallet.
The defendant was arrested the next day when he was found with
the victim's possessions. 2' The victim was called in to identify his
assailant and he identified the defendant as one of the men who
robbed him.2' There was no lawyer present at the identification
proceedings nor did the defendant ask for legal advice or obtain
advice of any right to the presence of counsel. 2

The defendant

was indicted for robbery and his motion to suppress the
identification evidence by both the trial and appellate courts was
denied. 2 3 The Illinois appellate court held that "the Wade-Gilbert
per se exclusionary rule is not applicable to pre-indictment
confrontations."24 The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to
the holding of the appellate court and affirmed its decision.25

17N.Y.

CONST. art I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him."
18406 U.S. 682 (1972).
19Id.at 684.
20 id.

21

Id at 684-85.

22

Id.at 685.
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 686-87.
24 Id at 686.
25
Id.at 691.
23
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In the companion cases United States v. Wade26 and Gilbert
v. California7 the Supreme Court held that:
[A] post-indictment pretrial lineup at which the
accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is a
critical stage of the criminal prosecution; that police
conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the
absence of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth
[aAd Fourteenth] Amendment right to counsel and
calls in question the admissibility at trial of the incourt identifications of the accused by witnesses
who attended the lineup.2"
This holding created the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary
rule "to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the
accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the
critical lineup.

29

In Kirby, the Supreme Court declined to extend

that rule to an identification that took place before the start of a
prosecutorial proceeding."

The Supreme Court noted "that a

person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel
attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial
proceedings have been initiated against him."3

Such adversary

judicial proceedings include a "formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment."32

The Nunez court heavily relied on two New York Court of
Appeals' cases in rendering its judgment in the instant case.
388 U.S. 218 (1967).

26

388 U.S. 263 (1967).

27

2

1Id.at 272.

29

ld.at 273.

30

Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690.

at 688.
" Id.
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/14
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People v. Hawkins33 consolidated four cases to determine the issue
of "whether a suspect has a right to counsel at an investigatory
lineup."34 In Hawkins, all four of the defendants stood in their
lineups without the assistance of counsel but before formal
adversarial proceedings.35

Two of the defendants had made

requests for counsel before entering their lineups but neither
request was granted.36

The defendants relied on People v.

Cunningham37 that held "once a suspect in custody requests the
assistance of counsel, he may not be questioned further in the
absence of an attorney . . . [and] an uncounseled waiver of a
constitutional right will not be deemed voluntary if it is made after
the right to counsel has been invoked."3

Concerning the other two

defendants in Hawkins, the police knew that each had prior
pending charges against them and that these defendants were
represented by counsel.3 9 These defendants relied on People v.
0 in seeking to have their identification evidence
Bartolomeo"

suppressed."

In Bartolomeo, the Court of Appeals held that

"[k]nowledge that one in custody is represented by counsel, albeit
on a separate, unrelated charge, precludes interrogation in the
32

Id. at 689.

" 435 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y. 1982).
3' Id. at 378.
15 Id. at 378-80.
36

Id. at 378-79.

400 N.E.2d 360 (N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 361.
39 Id. at 379-80.
40423 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1981), overruled by People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011
(N.Y. 1990) (holding that questioning on unrelated crimes does not violate
constitutional rights).
" Hawkins, 435 N.E.2d at 381.
37

38
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absence of counsel and renders ineffective any purported waiver of
the assistance of counsel when such waiver occurs out of the
presence of the attorney.

42

The Court of Appeals examined the importance of a
defendant's right to counsel in determining whether that right had
been violated in regards to any of the defendants in Hawkins. The
reasoning of New York's "indelible" right to counsel rule is "to
ensure that an individual's protection against self incrimination is
not rendered illusory during pretrial interrogation."43 However, the
court noted that the role of counsel is much more limited at
identification confrontations than it is at interrogations."

The

counselor may not actively advise his client during the lineup and
his role is mainly that of a passive observer. 5 On the other hand,
there is a certain need to have a lineup conducted in as close a
period of time to the incident under investigation. This is to ensure
the witness' ability to recall the incident, diminish the possibility
of mistaken identification, ensure that an innocent suspect is
released after only minimal delay, and assist the police as to
whether they should continue their search in the area of the crime. 6
The court in Hawkins concluded that "the limited benefits
provided by counsel at investigatory lineups are far outweighed by
the policy considerations militating against requiring counsel at
42

Bartolomeo, 423 N.E.2d at 374 (citing People v. Miller, 425 N.E.2d 879

(N.Y. 1981); see People v. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1979)).
43

Hawkins, 435 N.E.2d at 381.

44 Id. at 382 (citing People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898-99 (N.Y. 1976)).
45 Id. (citing People v. Blake, 320 N.E.2d 625, 630 (N.Y. 1974)).
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[the lineup] stage of the investigatory process."47 Therefore, the
right to counsel only arises after formal prosecutorial proceedings
have been initiated.4" Further, even if a suspect requests counsel,
the police have no obligation to secure counsel if the suspect is
only being placed in an investigatory lineup.49 However, the court
recognized that "if a suspect already has counsel, his attorney may
not be excluded from the lineup proceedings"5 ° unless the arrival of
counsel would cause unreasonable delay.5
The other case the court heavily relied upon in rendering its
decision in Nunez was People v. Wilson.5" In this case, the New
York Court of Appeals again examined the "interrelationship of an
investigatory lineup and a suspect's right to counsel.""

The

defendant was represented by an attorney on charges of criminal
possession of a stolen vehicle and weapon.54 The defendant said
that he did not want to speak to any detectives or participate in a
lineup without his attorney being present.55

The defendant's

request was then relayed to the police by the attorney who told
them not to put his client in a lineup unless he was present. 6 The
charges for the stolen vehicle and weapon were dismissed, but later
46

Id. See Blake, 320 N.E.2d at 630; United States v. Sanchez, 422 F.2d 1198,

1200 (2d Cir. 1970).
" Hawkins, 435 N.E.2d at 382
48

49

Id.

Id. at 383.

50 Id. (citing Blake, 320 N.E.2d at 631).
51 Id
52 680 N.E.2d 598 (N.Y. 1997).
13

Id. at 599.

54 id.
55

Id. at 600.

56 Id.
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that day the defendant was put in a lineup for charges of
homicide. 7 The defendant was informed of his Miranda rights,
which he waived, and was later identified by the witness as the
man who shot the victim. 8 The police never attempted to contact
the defendant's attorney. 9
The New York Court of Appeals noted that "there is
generally no independent basis in the State Constitution for
requiring counsel at investigatory lineups, although a right to
counsel does arise after the initiation of formal prosecutorial
proceedings."6
counsel

The fact that the defendant waived his right to

was ineffective

represented

by counsel.6

since the defendant actually
"[T]he

was

right to counsel at an

investigatory lineup is not absolute or abstract, and may be
overridden if exigent circumstances necessitate that the procedure
be conducted without counsel's presence.' 62 In Wilson, the court
found that no exigent circumstances existed to preclude the
attorney's presence at the lineup.63
The exigent circumstances discussed in Wilson were
examined more thoroughly by the Nunez court. The basic premise
behind all of these circumstances is based on the possibility of
unreasonable delay in assembling the lineup. In People v. Riley,'

" Wilson, 680 N.E.2d at 600.
58 Id.
59 Id
60
61
62

Id. at 601 (citing Hawkins, 435 N.E.2d at 382).
Id. (citing People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 618 (N.Y. 1978)).
Wilson, 680 N.E.2d at 602 (citing LaClere, 564 N.E.2d at 641-42).

63 Id.
64

551 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
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the defendant was represented by an attorney, who was known to
the police, but the attorney had to leave before the lineup was
ready. 5 After finding out, that the lineup was ready, the attorney
requested that it be adjourned.'

The court denied the defendant's

motion to suppress the evidence since the police were not required
to suspend the lineup if it was going to cause unreasonable delay.67
However, in Nunez, the police never called the attorney to notify
him that the lineup was ready. 8
Similarly, in People v. McRae,69 the defendant's attorney
made a request to have the lineup adjourned for the following
day.7" The police told the attorney that they had been preparing the
lineup for several hours in assembling the witnesses and fillers,
and that the identification witnesses could not be there the
following day.7'

The court denied the defendant's motion to

suppress the evidence holding that:
[E]ven where the right to counsel for preaccusatory
lineup purposes has so attached, the right is not
absolute. Rather, the police are merely required to
notify counsel of an impending lineup, if possible,
and provide a reasonable opportunity to attend. The
police are not, however, required to accede to
requests that counsel attend if it would cause
"unreasonable delay."72
65

Id.at 537.

66 d.

Id. (citing Hawkins, 435 N.E.2d at 383).
Nunez, 2004 WL 556591, at *5.
69 607 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
70
Id.at 626
67

68

71 id
72

Id. at 629 (citing LaClere, 564 N.E.2d at 641-42; Hawkins, 435 N.E.2d at

383).
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The Nunez court distinguished the instant case from McRae
in three ways. First, the police never inquired to find out if the
witnesses could return at a later date. 3 Second, the police never
called Mr. Murphy to see if he could return for the lineup. 4 Lastly,
the lineup was carried on with as though the defendant's right to
counsel never attached.75
The Nunez court also cited two cases where the defendants'
convictions were reversed due to improper lineup proceedings. In
People v. LoPizzo,76 the defendant's attorney told the police he
represented the defendant and that he would be out-of-town on the
day of the lineup, thereby requesting a one day adjournment. 7 The
police conducted the lineup without the attorney being present. 8
The court found that there was less of a necessity to conduct the
lineup on the day in question since the lineup was conducted seven
months after the crime.79 In Nunez, the police gave no reason why
the lineup had to be conducted on that day except the fact that all
the witnesses were present at the time.

°

In People v. Davis,"' the court found that the identification
evidence should be suppressed due to circumstances surrounding
the lineup. Here, the attorney for the defendant told the police that
" Nunez, 2004
74 id.

WL 556591, at *5.

75 Id.
76 570 N.Y.S.2d 307 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991).

77 Id. at

308.

78 Id.
79 id.
80

Nunez, 2004 WL 556591, at *5.
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he wanted to be present at the lineup.12 The police complied by
calling the attorney three times, however those calls occurred "well
after the close of business."83

The lineup ended up being

conducted after midnight, in the absence of the defendant's
attorney." As in LoPizzo, the court did not find a necessity for the
lineup to be conducted at that time since the crime had occurred
nine months before the lineup. 5
The final case discussed by the Nunez court was People v.
Cherry. 6

In Cherry, the defendant gave the detective his

attorney's card, which the detective used to leave several messages
with the attorney's office over the following two hours."

The

court upheld the defendant's conviction stating that "the officer
made repeated attempts to notify defendant's attorney of the
impending lineup, which is all that the law required."8

In the

instant case, the police made no attempts to contact Mr. Murphy
after his request to be present at the lineup.8
Therefore, the Nunez court concluded that the lineup
identification evidence should have been suppressed due to the
circumstances surrounding the procedure.9"

The defendant's

attorney had made a request to be present at the lineup and waited
567 N.Y.S.2d 880 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).

81

82 Id.
83 Id.
4

id.

85 id.
86 554
87

88

N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).

Id. at 884.
Id. at 885 (citing People v. Coates, 543 N.E.2d 440, 442 (N.Y. 1989))

(emphasis added).
89 Nunez, 2004 WL 556591, at *6.
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four hours before leaving the precinct.9 The police conducted the
lineup shortly after Mr. Murphy left the precinct and made no
attempt to contact him to see if he could attend.92 Furthermore,
there was no attempt on the behalf of the police to inquire if any of
the witnesses could appear at a later date to conduct the lineup.93
In looking at the exigent circumstances, there was no "legally
recognized excusal of counsel's presence" and "the police took the
94
risk that the adduced evidence would not be allowed.
In conclusion, there is no per se rule as to when the right to
counsel attaches in New York and each case must be judged on its
facts. "The lifeblood of the New York rule is that once the right to
counsel had indelibly attached, the defendant can effectively waive
the protections of counsel only if counsel is present." 95 Under the
United States Constitution, Nunez's right to counsel would not
have been violated unless a surrender was found to be an adverse
judicial proceeding. However, based on the exigent circumstances
of the case, the New York court found that the defendant did have
a right to counsel at his lineup.

Some of the major factors

considered by, the court included police knowledge that defendant
was represented by counsel, the absence of any effort of the police
to contact the defendant's attorney about when the lineup was
being conducted, and the failure of the police to see if the
90 Id. at *7.
9' Id. at
92

Id.

*3.

9 Id. at *5.
94 Nunez, 2004 WL 556591, at *6 (citing Wilson, 680 N.E.2d at 601; quoting
LaClere, 564 N.E.2d at 641).
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/14
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witnesses would be able to attend at another time. In this case, it
seems that the court found that there would not have been an
unreasonable delay in assuring the attorney's presence at the
lineup.
The New York Constitution has been defined through
caselaw to give more protection to a defendant's right to counsel
than the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme
Court has created the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule that
ensures a defendant's right to counsel once formal judicial
proceedings have been initiated against him. New York will look
at the circumstances of each case to determine whether or not the
right to counsel has attached and that right may be invoked, in
certain situations, prior to formal judicial proceedings being
initiated against a defendant.

Yale Pollack

9' Hawkins, 435 N.E.2d at 381.
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